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We study the influence of minimum quality standards in a two-region partial-equilibrium model 
of vertical product differentiation and trade. Three alternative standard setting arrangements are 
considered: Full Harmonization, National Treatment and Mutual Recognition. The analysis 
integrates the choice of a particular standard setting alternative by governments into the model. We 
provide a set of sufficient conditions for which Mutual Recognition emerges as one regulatory 
alternative that always improves welfare in both regions when compared to the case without 
regulation. We show that Mutual Recognition, being the default procedure if governments do not 
reach a unanimous decision, is the only possible equilibrium of the game. 
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1. Introduction 
In spite of the ongoing efforts to implement the directives on harmonization of standards put 
forth in the EU Commission's (1985) White paper, support for the harmonization of standards, 
especially minimum standards concerning product quality, safety, or environmental protection, 
varies considerably within the EU. The opposition to full harmonization of standards is in general 
based on the common belief that these standards, when binding for less advanced national 
industries but not for more advanced national industries, lead to increased market share for the 
latter. Moreover, some of the economically w eaker members in the EU would only agree to the 
Common Market program in exchange for massive subsidy promises1. 
The EU currently adopts three alternative ways of handling standards. These arrangements are: 
Full Harmonization, FH, where uniform standards a re set centrally for all member countries; 
Mutual Recognition, MR, where national governments set standards for their own industries and 
recognize the adequacy of each others’ standards; and National Treatment, NT, where national 
governments apply national standards to any product sold within their country. This gives rise to 
questions about the relative effects of different standard setting procedures and in particular about 
the possibility to regulate standards in such a way that the economically weaker regions do not take 
welfare losses. This paper will address some of these questions. 
The model to be developed below will represent some stylized facts about economic 
asymmetries within the EU. More precisely, two regions will be considered, labelled core and 
periphery, respectively2. The core will be characterized by a larger market, higher per-capita 
income, and lower cost of producing or developing products of a certain level of quality. Industry 
structure will be duopolistic. Regional governments, as members of an interregional council, either 
unanimously choose one of three alternative standard setting procedures or a default procedure 
takes effect.  
                                                 
1See, for example, Franzmeyer (1989), p. 313. 
2 Following, for example, Smith and Venables (1988) or Venables (1990), we could identify France, Germany, Italy 
and Great Britain as the core, and the rest of the EU as periphery.   3 
 
In both the fields of industrial organization and of international trade, there are fairly large 
bodies of literature focusing on product quality3. Some of this literature investigates the effects of 
minimum quality standards4. Ronnen (1991) uses Shaked and Sutton’s framework to demonstrate 
cases where quality standards improve welfare. He concludes that there exists a binding minimum 
quality standard such that all consumers are weakly better off, both firms have positive profits, and 
total welfare is increased. However, since there is only one market, there is no scope for strategic 
government interaction in this model. For example, Boom (1995) studies the effects of the adoption 
of minimum quality standards for two (identical) countries with segmented markets and compares 
the equilibria with uniform or asymmetric quality standards. The author shows that consumer's 
surplus and qualities are higher in both countries if no firm is forced out of the country's market 
with the higher minimum quality standard. Hansen and Nielsen (2006) study instead a two-country 
model in which two firms provide goods horizontally and vertically differentiated with partially 
integrated markets (i.e. there exist some positive finite trade costs). Assuming that all consumers 
have the same willingness to pay, fully covered markets and size asymmetry between countries, the 
authors show that, ceteris paribus, the high quality producer will appear in the country with the 
larger market. In addition, they show that market integration tends to increase the provision of the 
low quality and decrease the provision of the high quality; in this sense, market integration has 
effects similar to the introduction of a minimum quality standard. Our model extends Lutz (2000) 
with which shares a few features. The author compares two standard setting arrangements in a two-
region pure vertical differentiation model. He shows that Mutual Recognition is the optimal 
standard setting procedure when the two countries have firms with small cost differentials; 
otherwise, a fully harmonized standard that drives the inefficient producer out of the markets will 
                                                 
3 E.g., Leland (1979), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Shapiro (1983), Motta (1993), 
Johnson/Myatt (2003). 
4 E.g., Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hollander (1992), Ecchia/Lambertini (1997), Constatatos/Perrakis (1998), Scarpa 
(1998), Valletti (2000), Pezzino (2006), Besanko/Donnenfeld/White (1988), Das/Donnenfeld (1989), Copeland (1992), 
Jinji/Toshimitsu (2004). 
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be optimal. In contrast to our model, the aforementioned paper does not consider the setting 
arrangement we called National Treatment (with and without entry deterrence) and assumes 
identical market size and average income in the two countries. In this paper, when we describe the 
equilibrium under National Treatment with deterred entry we consider the case in which the non-
cooperative choice of national standard by regional governments makes not profitable for the low 
quality producer to enter the richer and larger market. This case should not be confused with the 
model described by Lambertini and Scarpa (1999) and (2006). The authors analyze the introduction 
of a minimum quality standard in a single-market vertically differentiated duopoly à la Ronnen 
(1991). In contrast to most contributions in the literature, relaxing the assumption that the high 
quality firm might decrease its quality provision after the adoption of a standard in order to 
strategically deter entrance of the low quality provider, they show that an equilibrium with deterred 
entry exists for any combination of parameters and it would be always selected be the risk 
dominance criterion. In our model, instead, the low quality provider at most will be driven out of 
one regional market (the one in which the high quality producer is located) because of the welfare 
maximising decision of the government of the larger and richer region and not due to the strategic 
predatory behaviour of the competitor. 
 
Our paper initially describes a general model and provides a set of sufficient conditions that let 
MR emerge as the only equilibrium of a game in which, first, regional governments strategically 
choose the standard setting arrangements and the quality standards and, then, firms compete in 
qualities. Secondly, the paper presents a specific model that satisfies the conditions that produce the 
results mentioned above. The particular model employed extends the framework of Ronnen (1991) 
for the two-country case, i.e. it is a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation and 
trade. 
We study a four-stage game in pure strategies. In the first stage, both regional governments, as 
members of an interregional council, announce one choice out of three alternative standard setting   5 
procedures. If the two announcements coincide the particular procedure will be applied, otherwise 
the default procedure, MR, takes effect. The governments' role in the second stage depends on the 
first-stage outcome. In the third stage of the game, firms simultaneously determine quality to be 
produced unless a standard is binding. In the fourth stage, firms compete in prices, given qualities. 
We look for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria by the method of backwards induction. 
Mutual Recognition emerges as one regulatory alternative that always improves welfare in both 
regions when compared to the case without regulation. Since the foreign region always prefers 
Mutual Recognition over all other available alternatives and this is the default in the first stage of 
the game, this is also the only possible equilibrium outcome of the game. If the domestic firm has a 
sufficiently large cost advantage, then the domestic region will also prefer Mutual Recognition over 
all available alternatives. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a general model and 
provides a set of conditions that produce our main results. Section 3 presents a specific model of 
pure vertical differentiation satisfying the conditions described in section 2. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The general model 
In this section we present our argument in general form. Two regions belong to an interregional 
federation. Each region has a regional government and one representative in an interregional 
council. Moreover, there are two firms each located in a different region. The two firms produce the 
same product, differentiated only by quality. They compete in qualities in the long run and in prices 
in the short run. Before quality competition takes places, governments can decide whether to 
introduce minimum quality standards, MQS, on production and choose the type of standard setting 
arrangement. In particular, we consider three different setting arrangements: under Full 
Harmonization, FH, a council maximizes the sum of regional welfares by setting one uniform   6 
standard5; under Mutual Recognition, MR, regional governments maximize regional social welfare 
by noncooperatively setting regional producer standards; finally, under national Treatment, NT, 
governments maximize regional social welfare by noncooperatively setting regional standards. If 
the two announcements coincide the particular procedure will be applied, otherwise the default 
procedure, MR, takes effect.  
Even if firms and regions were identical, qualities offered in an unregulated equilibrium would 
not be identical (choosing different qualities the two firms can ensure non negative profits and 
overcome the Bertrand Paradox). In what follows, we show that, if a set of sufficient conditions is 
satisfied, the regional government in which the low quality producer operates will always prefer to 
set a standard according to the MR setting procedure; consequently, MR will be the only standard 
setting procedure adopted in the long run equilibrium.  
 
Throughout the paper we use the following notation. The two regions are denoted by , rCP = , 
whereas the two respective firms are denoted by , icp = . Anticipating equilibrium prices produced 
by the competition in the short run (that in this section we will not model) each firm chooses the 
provide quality  i s  to maximise profits, given by ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, icpicpii ssRssks P=- , where  ( ) , icp Rss  
represents the revenues of firm  i and  ( ) ii ks is the quality-dependent cost function. Variable 
production costs are assumed equal to zero. Consumers in each region obtain surplus from 
purchasing either of the two products offered in their regional market. Consumer surplus in region r 
is denoted by r CS . Regional welfare is given by  rir WCS =P+  and global (interregional) welfare 
by CP WWW =+.  Cn CS  indicates the surplus of consumers in region C when firm p does not enter 
the market. 
                                                 
5Maximizing the sum of regional welfares can be seen as the outcome of Nash-Bargaining between both governments 
in the Council.   7 
In this paper we will concentrate on the case in which, if the market is not regulated, in 
equilibrium cp ss > . This case arises naturally if firms’ costs of providing quality are sufficiently 
different. Suppose the simple case where  ( ) ( ) cccc ksbks =  and ( ) ( ) pppp ksbks = . If  p b  is 
sufficiently high relative to  c b  the only remaining pure-strategy equilibrium would be given 
by cp ss > . Another way to ensure a unique equilibrium where  cp ss >  is to make the somewhat 
plausible assumption that firm p faces a technological constraint of the form 
max
pp ss £  (in other 
words,  ( ) pp ks is infinite for all 
max
pp ss > ), where 
max
p s  is smaller than the highest quality level the 
firm p can select without inducing firm c to select a quality that would make it the low quality 
provider in the market. In addition, we will assume that consumers located in region  C have a 
higher willingness to pay for quality than the agents located in region P. 
 
The following set of assumptions is sufficient to ensure our results. 
 
Assumptions 
1)  /0 cp Rs ¶¶< ,  /0 pc Rs ¶¶>, 
22 /0 ii Rs ¶¶<, 
2 /0 ccp Rss ¶¶¶>,  /0 ii ks ¶¶> and 
22 /0 ii ks ¶¶>  
2)  /0 rr CSs ¶¶>,  /0 rz CSs ¶¶> and 
2 /0 rrz CSss ¶¶¶>, 
22 /0 rr CSs ¶¶£ 






CSsCSssWssdx ¶¶‡¶¶¶-¶¶¶ ￿ . 
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Assumption 1) ensures that useful concavity properties hold for profit maximization. In 
addition, it guaranties that at the unregulated equilibrium /0 cp dsds > , i.e.  p s  is treated as a 
strategic complement by the high quality firm (it is also true that /0 pc dsds > ).  
Assumption 2) says that consumer surplus increases when either of the two qualities in the 
market increases. Marginal consumer surplus in each region is also increasing in the quality chosen 
by the firm located in the other region. This assumption implies also that qualities chosen in (any) 
unregulated equilibrium are socially insufficient.  
Assumption 3) requires that an increase in the low quality has a positive aggregate effect on 
revenues of the high quality provider and on the surplus of consumers located in the same region. 
This is not a trivial assumption, since intuitively  / cp Rs ¶¶  might be negative: an increase in the low 
quality for a given  c s  increases the level of competition in the short run, producing a negative effect 
of firm c revenues. We are assuming that the positive effect on consumers’ surplus more than 
offsets the possible loss in revenues. In addition, assumption 3) says that marginal consumer surplus 
in the high quality region is higher when both qualities are offered in the market. The last condition 
included in Assumption 3) (as it will be clear later on) ensures that  / Cc Ws ¶¶  remains positive 
when  c s  is held at the FH level and  p s  is decreased. 
Assumptions 1)-3) describe in general terms a market (formed by two segmented markets) in 
which competition in the short run is fierce enough to justify the positive slope of the quality best 
response function of the high quality provider in the unregulated market. An intuition is that if low 
quality increases, the products in the market are more similar and the high quality provider find 
profitable to increase its quality to (at least partially) restore the degree of differentiation. Moreover, 
in such a market consumers value quality and their surplus increases when either quality in the 
market is increased. 
   9 
2.1. Full Harmonization, FH 
Lemma 1 describes the effect of the introduction of a MQS under a FH setting procedure.  
 
Lemma 1 
Moving from no regulation to FH will strictly increase both qualities, total welfare, and core 
welfare. 
Proof 
Remember that in the unregulated equilibrium cp ss > . Therefore, the harmonized standard will 
be binding only for the low quality in the market, i.e.  p s . 
Increase of both qualities follows directly from the positive sign of /0 cp dsds > . Total welfare 
increases with the introduction of a harmonized standard if the following equation is positive: 
(1) 
P  R dWds dWdW CS CS
=
dsdsds sds s s
ds CS R CS
              


















Equation (1) is indeed positive at the unregulated equilibrium, since marginal profits are equal 
to zero for both firms,  //0 cpcp RsCSs ¶¶+¶¶>  according to assumption 2) and the remaining 
terms are positive. Q.E.D. 
 
In addition, note two important properties regarding the profits of the low quality firm. First, in 
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implying that a harmonized standard that marginally increases  p s  would have initially a 
positive effect on firm p’s profits6. However, we can show that in the FH equilibrium, profits for the 
low quality firm become negative. This result can be seen using the information embodied in 
equation (1). First, note that the zero-profit cost condition for firm p is say 
0
pp kR = . According to 










Thus, given the convexity property of the cost function, at FH
0
pp kk > . 
Even if initially an increase in  p s  has a positive effect on firm  p’s profits, the equilibrium 
reached under FH requires a level of  p s  so high that revenues can not cover the quality-dependent 
costs. Intuitively, such a result can be explained by the structure of the FH procedure itself. As we 
have already pointed out, in the unregulated equilibrium both qualities are socially insufficient. To 
increase welfare, however, the interregional council can only impose a standard on  p s  and, 





2.2. Mutual Recognition, MR 
Let us now consider MR standard setting procedure in order to be able to compare the results to 
FH. Under MR each regional government maximises its own regional welfare setting a standard for 
the regional firm. The first order conditions for the solution of the problem under MR are given by: 
 
                                                 
6 Reminiscent of the result shown in Ronnen (1991), when the standard is sufficiently close to the quality chosen in the 
unregulated equilibrium, the low quality firm earns higher profits due to the quality commitment imposed by the 
standard.   11 
(3) 






















In the unregulated equilibrium both conditions are clearly greater than zero, implying that the 
standard best responses are located everywhere above firms' unrestricted quality best response. 
Before comparing FH and MR, let us consider first a benchmark quality equilibrium. 
Global social optimality can be achieved if the interregional council could maximize global 
welfare choosing both qualities provided in the market. Such a socially optimal solution will be the 
benchmark, BM, to which we will compare the equilibria under the various standard setting 
procedures considered. 
Lemma 2 compares the quality solution under FH and MR to the socially optimal solution, BM. 
 
Lemma 2 
Define a benchmark as the result of maximizing the sum of regional welfares, W, with respect to 
both qualities subject to subsequent price competition. 
a) At FH, //0 CcCc WsCSs ¶¶=¶¶>. Any horizontal move to the left (any reduction in  p s  
without reducing  c s ) will always leave /0 Cc Ws ¶¶>. 
b) Compared to the benchmark, FH will result in  c s  being too low and  p s  being too high. 
c) Compared to the benchmark, MR will result in both qualities being too low. 
Proof 
a) At FH,  //0 CcCc WsCSs ¶¶=¶¶>. Let  cMR s  and  cFH s  be  c s  at the Mutual Recognition 
solution and the Full Harmonization solution, respectively. Given assumption 3), we know that a 
reduction in  p s  without reducing  c s  will always leave  /0 Cc Ws ¶¶>, i.e.  hh MR FH ss >  must hold.   12 
b) Under FH,  ////0 cCcpcPc WsCSsRsCSs ¶¶=¶¶+¶¶+¶¶> and 
( )( ) /////0 pcpCcpcPc WsdsdsCSsRsCSs ¶¶=-¶¶+¶¶+¶¶<  hold since the RHS of equation 
(1) is equal to zero. Hold  c s  constant at the FH level and decrease  p s  until  /0 p Ws ¶¶=. At this 
point,  ////0 cCcpcPc WsWsRsCSs ¶¶=¶¶+¶¶+¶¶> by part a). It follows that  c s  is too low. 
Hold  p s  constant at the FH level. Then for any  c s ,  /0 p Ws ¶¶< holds. It follows that  p s  is too 
high. 
c) Under MR,  ///0 cpcPc WsRsCSs ¶¶=¶¶+¶¶> and 
///0 pCpcp WsCSsRs ¶¶=¶¶+¶¶>  hold since the RHS of equations (3) and (4) are equal to 
zero. Q.E.D. 
 
The result in lemma 2 can be intuitively explained by the structure of the two setting 
arrangements considered. Given the assumptions of the model, we know that qualities in the 
unregulated equilibrium are socially insufficient. Under FH, as we mentioned earlier, the council 
maximises global welfare only through directly affecting  p s  that, in the end, will be excessive 
compared to BM.  c s  will increase, but not sufficiently compared to BM. Under MR a standard is 
imposed on both qualities provided in the market. However, since each government selects the 
standard to maximise only own regional welfare, the standards produce socially insufficient quality 
levels (however higher than in the unregulated equilibrium). 
 
We are now in condition to describe the welfare effect of a move from FH to MR. Proposition 1 
summarizes the results. 
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Proposition 1 
Moving from FH to MR will strictly increase high quality, decrease low quality, and increase 
p W .  
Proof 
The results with respect to qualities follow from Lemma 2. Suppose that a uniform standard 
was set at the optimal FH level. In this case, the RHS of equation (1) is equal to zero and firm c 
chooses its quality by equating its marginal revenue and marginal cost. This implies that the RHS 
of equation (3) is less than zero, whereas the RHS of equation (4) is greater than zero. It follows 
that a gradual reduction of  p s  down to the point where the RHS of equation (3) equals zero will 
increase peripheral welfare and decrease core welfare (by marginal properties of revenues and 
consumer surplus). At this point, the peripheral region is on its standard best response, but the core 
region is below its standard best response. The RHS of equation  (4) will still be equal to 
/0 Cc CSs ¶¶>. Consequently, core welfare can be increased by raising  c s  which, in turn, will 
further increases peripheral welfare. Peripheral welfare is unambiguously increased, whereas core 
welfare is decreased by the reduction in  p s and increased by the increase in  c s . The lower the 
peripheral cost disadvantage the less will  p s  be decreased relative to the increase in  c s . Q.E.D. 
 
Moving from FH to MR has a positive effect on  P W . First, MR requires firm p to provide a 
lower quality and, consequently, allows it not to make a loss (the increase in profits more than 
offsets the decrease in  P CS  for the lower  p s ). In addition, MR requires a higher level of  c s , 
producing a second positive effect on  P W .Whether the increase in  c s  can be welfare improving for 
region C only depends on the cost function of firm c. If it is not too costly to increase quality, the 
increase in  c s  (and the following increase in consumer surplus) and the decrease in  p s  (and the   14 
following increase in  C P ) can more than offset the negative effect produced on  C CS  by the 
decrease in  p s  and the negative effect on  C P  produced by the increase in  c s  and costs.  
 
2.3. National Treatment, NT 
We can now analyse the case in which each government noncooperatively and simultaneously 
sets consumer standards for the respective region and apply them to all imports, i.e. the standard 
setting procedure of National Treatment, NT. With both firms entering in both markets, each 
regional standard can only be binding, if at all, for the low quality firm, i.e. firm p. If government C 
sets a standard sufficiently high, it can deter entry by firm p and the standard will be binding only 
for firm  c. Moving from NT with accommodated entry to NT with deterred entry involves an 
increase of  c s  and a decrease to zero of  p s  in the C market. It follows that the government of 
region C prefers to deter entry of firm p only if it can benefit from a cost advantage sufficiently 
large. 
 
2.3.1 National Treatment where the Low Quality Firm Enters Both Markets 
The government of region  C has the greater incentive to set a high standard because of its 
consumers' greater willingness to pay for high quality and firm c's cost advantage. Hence, only the 
standard chosen by government C will be binding. Firm p will only enter market C if its profit from 
providing the higher quality in both markets is greater than or equal to its profit from providing the 
lower quality in market P only. 
Consequently, government  C will set a standard such that firm  p’ s   profits when entry is 
accommodated just equal profits when entry is deterred. Denote the minimum profit required for 
entry as 
min




pp P‡P    15 
Region P government would also like to increase  p s  along firm c's quality best response, but 
not as much as region  C government.  P W  reaches a unique maximum along  c's quality best 
response somewhere between the unregulated quality equilibrium and the FH solution. Region P 
government can affect the binding quality standard only through measures affecting firm p's profits 
when entry is deterred, i.e. 
min
p P . If firm  p’s profits with deterred entry are lower than with 
accommodated entry at the  P W  maximizing point on firm c's quality best response, government P 
sets its standard to  p P  with deterred entry. Region P government also needs to find the point on 
firm c's quality best response when entry is accommodated where  P W  is maximized, say MF. Let 
an added subscript n denote non-entry variables.  
Let firm c's marginal quality best response when entry is deterred be denoted by / cpn dsds . 
Government P needs to calculate firm p's maximum profit when entry is deterred. Differentiating 
the appropriate objective function with respect to  p s  yields equation (6). 
(6) 
pnpnpn d R k R ds
()n








Differentiating the  P W  with respect to  p s  yields equation (7). 
(7) 
pp PPP   R ds dW CS CS









Differentiating government C's objective function with respect to  p s  yields equation (8). 
(8) 
CcCcC dWds  CS R CS









Since firm c is on its quality best response, the RHS of equation (8) will be positive.  
Consequently, the equilibrium under NT with accommodated entry can be calculated by 
maximizing  C W  along firm c's quality best response subject to inequality (5).   16 




Under National Treatment (with accommodated entry), government P will calculate  p P  at the 
P W  maximum along firm c's quality best response, say  P MF P . It will then set a standard such that 
ppnp FH MF P<P<P . 
Proof 
By equations (7) and (8),  C W  along firm c's quality best response is steadily increasing in  p s , 
whereas  P W  i s maximized at a point, say MF, where  p s  is higher then in the unregulated 
equilibrium and lower than in under FH. At MF,  p P  is nonnegative and decreasing in  p s . 
Furthermore,  p P  is negative at FH. Region P government sets a standard such that  pn P  are as 
close as possible to profits with accommodated entry at MF,  p MF P . It can choose a standard such 
that  p P  with deterred entry are positive. Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2 describes a move from the equilibrium under NT with accommodated entry to 
MR. Again, we show that region P is strictly better off moving to MR. Moving to MR requires a 
decreases in  p s , with the following decrease in costs for firm p and an increase in  p W . Government 
C calls for a higher level of  c s , increasing  p W  further. 
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Proposition 2 
Moving from NT (with accommodated entry) to MR will strictly increase  c s  while  p s  may 
increase or decrease.  P W  strictly increases.  
Proof 
b) At NT, the RHS of equation (7) is less than or equal to zero. Hence, the RHS of equation (3) 
is less than zero. Decreasing  p s  until the RHS of equation  (3) equals zero while holding  c s  
constant will increase  P W  while decreasing  C W . At this point, region  P is on its standard best 
response, but region C is below its standard best response. The rest of the proof is analogous to the 
proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D. 
 
2.3.2. National Treatment: Low Quality Firm’s Entry into the Core Market is Deterred 
If firm c’ s cost advantage is large enough, then region C government prefers to set its regional 
standard under NT so high that firm p’ s entry is deterred. The increase in  C W  due to increased  c s  
more than offsets the welfare loss due to the unavailability of the product of firm p. The problem 
faced by regional governments is similar to the case of MR. However,  C W  does not include 
consumer surplus derived from the consumption of the product provided by firm p and  P W  does 
not include profits derived from selling to region C. It can be shown that concavity properties of the 
governments' objective functions hold, ensuring that welfare maximization problems have unique 
solutions. Differentiating  P W  with respect to  p s  yields equation (9). 
(9) 
pn PnP   dW CS





Differentiating  C W  function with respect to  c s  yields equation (10). 
(10) 
CcCn dW  CS
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Proposition 3 compares NT with deterred entry to MR and shows once more that region P is 
better off moving to MR. Under NT with deterred entry qualities provided are socially too low. In 
region C the increase in  c s  necessary to deter firm p’s entry is not enough to offset the lack in the 
market of the low quality good. Moving to MR increases  p P  and the increases in qualities has a 
positive effect on  P W . 
 
Proposition 3 
Moving from National Treatment (with deterred entry) to Mutual Recognition will strictly 
increase both qualities and both regions' welfare. 
Proof 
Note that  // pnppp RsRs ¶¶<¶¶  and  // CncCc CSsCSs ¶¶<¶¶ . Comparing equations (3) and 
(4) with equations (9) and (10) shows then that regional standard best responses under NT (with 
deterred entry) must lie everywhere below the standard best responses under MR. The quality result 
follows. A move from NT (with deterred entry) to MR without adjusting qualities and standards 
would strictly increase both regions' welfare by allowing firm p’ s product to be sold in region C. 
Given that qualities are too low, under NT the RHS of both equations (3) and (4) are positive. It 
follows that a gradual increase of  p s  up to the point where the RHS of equation (3) equals zero will 
increase both regions' welfare. At this point, region P is on its standard best response, but region C 
is below its standard best response. The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Given the results describes in proposition 1-3 we can analyse governments’ setting procedure 
choice. Governments have to choose one regulatory regime in the interregional council. This regime 
is either chosen by unanimous vote or a default rule, namely applying MR. Since region  P 
government always prefers the default rule MR, this is the only possible outcome. Note that even   19 
with a different default rule, MR would remain a long run equilibrium as long as a firm c could 
benefits from a sufficiently large cost advantage. 
 
3. Vertical Differentiation 
In this section we study a specific model of duopolistic competition with endogenous quality 
choice and show that it satisfies the assumptions proposed in section 2. The model is a two-region 
extension of the model studied in Ronnen (1991). In addition, we assume that the two competitors 
in the market and the two regions that form the market are not symmetric. In particular, the model 
includes the following assumptions. 
 
- There are two separate regions, denoted by  , rCP = . 
- In each region is located a firm. Firms are denoted by  , icp = . Each firm produces a single 
variety of a quality-differentiated product. Products are differentiated on the basis of a single 
attribute, "quality",  0 j s ‡ ,  , jhl = . When the qualities provided differ, we refer to them as "high" 
(h) quality and "low" (l) quality, respectively. Both firms have constant marginal cost (equal to 
zero) in quantity produced. However, they have to incur a fixed "cost of providing quality",  i k , 
before entering into production; in particular, 
2
iij kbs = ,  0 i b > . Firm  c has a technological 
advantage in developing quality, i.e.  cp bb < .  
- Each firm’s problem is the maximization of the profit function: 
(11)  iCjCjPjPji pqpqk P=+-  
where  rj q  is the demand of good j in region r. 
- The two product markets are regionally segmented. The product qualities are known to all 
consumers. Each consumer may purchase at most one unit of a product of either high or low 
quality. We assume consumers have identical ordinal preferences across regions and differ only in 
their incomes. In particular, consumers can be ordered according to an "income parameter"  t ,   20 
where t is uniformly distributed over its support. In region  C a mass  2 T ‡  of consumers are 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, T], whereas a unit mass of consumers in the periphery 
region is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]7.  
The utility of the generic consumer z who lives in region  r and buys one unit of the good 
produced by firm i at price  rj p  and quality  j s  is given by: 
(12) 
if one unit one good if purchased









The marginal willingness to pay for quality of the consumers located in region r respectively 
indifferent to buy a product of either quality and indifferent to buy a product of low quality or not 





























We study a four-stage game in pure strategies. In the first stage, both regional governments, as 
members of an interregional council, announce one choice out of three alternative standard setting 
procedures. If the two announcements coincide the particular procedure will be applied, otherwise 
the default procedure, MR, takes effect. The governments' role in the second stage depends on the 
first-stage outcome. In the third stage of the game, firms simultaneously determine quality to be 
produced unless a standard is binding. In the fourth stage, firms compete in prices, given qualities. 
We look for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria by the method of backwards induction. 
 
                                                 
7This also implies that region C has higher per capita income than region P.   21 
In the last stage of the game, each firm will have two first order conditions for price choice, 
obtained by setting the partial derivatives of profit with respect to own prices in either market equal 
to zero, since markets are segmented.  Solving these two equations simultaneously for the firm's 
own prices yields the price reaction function for each firm. 






















It can be shown that the second order conditions for profit maximizations and consumers’ 
positive-demand conditions are satisfied.  
Let us consider briefly the unregulated equilibrium. 
To derive the firms’ quality best responses, we need to investigate each firm’s profit function, 
given the other firm’s quality choice, and taking into account that both firms choose equilibrium 
prices. This profit function will be a composite function, consisting of a segment where the firm is 
the low-quality producer and another segment where the firm is the high-quality producer. Firm i’s 
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The market equilibria in pure strategies without government intervention are simply given by 
the intersections of the quality best responses. Generally, there will be two pure-strategy equilibria. 
As we did in section 2, we want to concentrate on asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria where 
the low-cost firm (i.e. the firm located in the Core region) provides high quality. From now on then:   22 












where  r R represents the revenue function of the firm located in region r. 
Equations (18) through (21) describe properties of the total revenue function for both markets. 
These properties satisfy assumption 1. 





































































If no standard is adopted, in stage three firms maximize profits choosing qualities that solve 
first order conditions. 
Applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions, we can derive the slopes of 
both reaction functions:  




























   23 
It can be shown that 0/1 id dsds << . Qualities are strategic complements for both firms. 
Consumer surplus in each region are given by: 
(24) 
( ) ( )



















The following p roperties of consumer surplus in either region satisfy the requirements of 
assumption 2. 
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The expression in equation (25) is strictly positive for any pair of qualities chosen in a market 
equilibrium, since a market equilibrium requires the low-quality firm's marginal revenue to be 
positive, which is only the case if  4/7 pc ss < . 
Note, in addition, that  //0 Cpcp CSsRs ¶¶+¶¶> , as required by assumption 3. 
As required by assumption 3, it can also be shown that at FH,  //0 CcCc WsCSs ¶¶=¶¶> and 
that a reduction in  p s  without reducing  c s  will always leave  /0 Cc Ws ¶¶>. 
In the previous section we have shown that a move from FH to MR involves a decrease in  p s  
and an increase in  c s . The latter move increases both regions' welfare, but the former has a negative   24 
effect on core welfare. This suggests that the peripheral region will prefer MR to FH, but the core 
region may not. In fact, the core region's preference depends on relative cost. If firm c's cost 
advantage is large, MR will lead to higher core welfare. The core region will prefer MR rather than 
FH if  ( ) cp bgb < , where  ( ) p gb  describes combinations of cost parameters where regional core 




ﬁ¥ > .  
In the previous section, in addition, we argued that the core government prefers to deter entry of 
the peripheral firm if the core cost advantage is sufficiently large. Let  ( ) , cp NTnbb  and 
( ) , cp NTebb  be the quality equilibria as functions of cost parameters under NT with deterred entry 
and NT with accommodated entry, respectively. The core region will prefer NT with deterred entry 
if  ( ) cp bhb < , where  ( ) p hb  describes combinations of cost parameters where regional core 
welfare under NT with deterred entry equals welfare under NT with accommodated entry. It can be 
shown that  ( ) 0 p hb > ,  ( )/0 pp hbb ¶¶> ,  ( ) lim0
p
p b hb
ﬁ¥ > .  
Taken together, functions  ( ) p gb  and  ( ) p hb  can be used to distinguish four cases. If the core 
cost advantage is "large", the core government deters entry under NT and prefers MR over all 
alternative regulatory regimes. If the core cost advantage is "small", the core government 
accommodates entry under NT and prefers FH over all alternative regulatory regimes. If core cost 
advantage is "intermediate", the remaining two cases result. 
The effects of alternative regulatory regimes relative to the case without regulation are 
summarized in Table 1. A decrease (an increase) of a particular variable is denoted by " -" ("+"), 
whereas the question mark indicates that the direction of the effect could not be determined. It is 
noteworthy that MR unambiguously increases welfare and consumer surplus in both regions as well 
as both qualities.    25 
 
Table 1.  Effects of Standards Under Different Regulatory Regimes 
  FH  NTe  NTn  MR 
W  +  +  ?  + 
WC  +  +  ?  + 
WP  ?  ?  ?  + 
CSC  +  +  ?  + 
CSP  +  +  +  + 
? c  -  -  ?  - 
? p  -  -  -  - 
Sc  +  +  +  + 
Sp  +  +  ?  + 
 
In the first stage of the game, governments choose one regulatory regime in the Council.  This 
regime is either chosen by unanimous vote or a default rule, namely applying Mutual recognition, 
takes effect. Since the peripheral government always prefers the default rule MR, this is the only 
possible outcome of this game. Note that even with a different default rule, MR would remain a 
Nash equilibrium as long as  ( ) cp bgb < . 
 
6. Conclusions 
Support for the harmonization of standards, especially minimum standards concerning product 
quality, safety, or environmental protection, varies considerably within the EU. 
The EU currently adopts three alternative ways of handling standards. These arrangements are: 
Full Harmonization, Mutual Recognition, and National Treatment. The objective of our paper has 
been to shed some light on some questions about the relative effects of different standard setting   26 
procedures and in particular about the possibility to regulate standards in such a way that the 
economically weaker regions do not take welfare losses. Specifically,  the paper has extended 
Ronnen (1991) model studying the introduction of MQS in an asymmetric two-region model with 
segmented markets. The strategic choice of standard setting arrangements by the two region 
governments has been studied. 
The paper has shown that concerns about adverse consequences of minimum quality standards 
might not be entirely valid. Whether a particular region will gain or lose from the introduction of a 
standard setting procedure depends on the procedure chosen. Within the framework of this model, 
welfare of the “peripheral” region will always be largest under MR. This leads to MR being the 
sole equilibrium outcome since it is the default procedure. In particular, this could indicate that the 
economically weaker members in the EU could be better off resisting the harmonization of product 
standards in the Council of Ministers of the EU. The “core” region’s welfare will be largest under 
MR if its industry has a large cost advantage. This could indicate that MR of standards is more 
likely to prevail for industries with large cost differences. 
To conclude, it is worth to notice that our paper produces some insights that can be related to 
the broad issue of global standards and globalisation. The paper provides some reasonable 
conditions to ensure the no existence of an equilibrium with Full Harmonization. In this sense, the 
model gives theoretical support to the growing belief8 that global agreement on standards is unlikely 
to be achieved and that regional standards should be a more probable outcome. In addition, 
literature on globalisation interestingly stresses the increasing importance of firm-based standards9 
(e.g. a uniform quality standard requirements that must be followed by all of a firm's facilities 
around the world, even if these firm-based standards exceed the requirements of local and national 
regulations). In our opinion, extending the model to allow multinational firms to compete globally 
and to set internal quality standards could be an interesting topic for future research. 
                                                 
8 See Thompson (2005). 
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